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Stuff & Light: Paradoxes of Transubstantiation in Art and Poetry 
 
Paradoxically, all the stuff in the universe is, at the same time, both material and 
immaterial, substantial and insubstantial, determinate and indeterminate. There is a 
great mystery surrounding the ways in which fluid indefinite fields of energy give rise 
to material objects or substances. Paradoxically again, all the phenomena we would 
normally call the ‘stuff in the universe’, only comprises about one-tenth of the density 
of the universe. The other nine-tenths, often referred to as dark matter, has no 
luminosity and is only known due to the gravitational effects it has on other bodies. 
 
Artworks are also polysemic, paradoxical, ambiguous – both material and immaterial 
- with no fixed essence and indeterminate as to definition and meaning. They manifest 
these qualities in a condensed fashion, drawing attention to, and celebrating, the 
complexity of making and interpreting. 
 
This paper consists of an anthology of notes about the first of these paradoxical states 
of existence – in which the odd things we call objects or substances are both stuff and 
light, matter and energy – and suggest a few correspondences between this 
phenomena and the manifestation of thoughts and feelings in art and poetry. 
Reference is made to Adorno, Madhyamika Buddhism, and to the literature of 
mysticism and sub-atomic physics. 
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In the reductive search for the ultimate substance, which was once a goal for the hard 
sciences, the atom was posited as the building block out of which the universe was 
built – Democritus, the Greek, (c.460-c.370BC) was one of the first to believe this. 
But as the atom was mapped in the early part of the twentieth century, researchers 
realised that the atom itself was more like a cloud than a speck of dust, a cloud that 
was largely empty space - a tiny field of energy bounded by the shifting trajectories of 
electrons, neutrons, protons and other sub-atomic forces. In Bryson’s words, the atom-
cloud is a “zone of statistical probability marking the area beyond which the electron 
only very seldom strays.”1 Bryson also reminds us that “if an atom were expanded to 
the size of a cathedral, the nucleus [the zone of neutrons and protons] would be only 
about the size of a fly”. (184)  It is this concrete emptiness which lies at the 
paradoxical heart of our solid world. The things we bump into, the hammer that hits 
the nail (or our thumb) and the chair we sit on, are quite literally condensations of 
space that happen to reflect, refract or transmit light, and thus be visible to one 
apparatus or another, including the human eye. The mystery as to how indeterminate 
minds can be at the same time congealed-jelly-like brains, is only slightly more 
puzzling than how clouds of sub-atomic forces in vast numbers of almost empty 
porous bubbles can be at the same time a turnip. 
 
The other paradoxical feature of atoms, hardly believable, is that despite their 
smallness and delicate cloud-like fuzziness, they are remarkably durable. It is almost 
certainly the case that every atom in my body, or yours, has passed through many 
stars and been part of millions of other organisms before becoming me or you and 
passing on to be part of countless other entities. In his inimitable way, Bryson (176) 
points out that atoms are so numerous and so enduring, that any or all of us, may now 
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be composed of billions of atoms that were once part of Shakespeare, or Buddha, or 
Michelangelo, or, spare the thought, any human embodiment of evil you care to 
imagine – though it takes, apparently a number of decades before atoms come 
thoroughly back into circulation after they have been embodied, so to speak. 
 
These characteristics of atoms and their sub-atomic constituents raise obvious 
questions about our own sense of self-ownership, self-identity and solidity. When 
Octavio Paz in a poem entitled, Objects & Apparitions, writes of Joseph Cornell’s 
small box-like artworks, as:  
 
 
Monuments to every moment,  
refuse of every moment, used:  
cages for infinity2 
 
 
he could have been writing about each of us. In another poem entitled, A Draft of 
Shadows, Paz writes of, “the body and its interwoven languages, / knot of phantoms 
touched by thought / and dissolved with a touch.”3 In these verbal images he conveys 
something of the paradoxical, and problematic, nature of our existence as embodied 
minds, as thinking flesh. 
 
Sir Arthur Eddington: “The external world of physics has thus become a world of 
shadows. In removing our illusions we have removed the substance, for indeed we 
have seen that substance is one of the greatest of our illusions.”4 
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Writing from a Sufi perspective, Shaikh ad-Darqâwî notes, “You are an illusion and a 
nothingness in a nothingness.” He goes on: “if you were to examine yourself, you 
would find God instead of finding yourself, and there would be nothing left of you but 
a name without a form.”5  
 
The Algerian Sufi master, Ahmad al’Alawî, (1869-1934) writes: “Things lie hidden in 
their opposites, and but for the existence of opposites, the Opposer would have no 
manifestation.”6 One wonders if there are echoes here of Derrida’s differance. 
 
Inside every apparently solid object there is an infinity of space, just as in every mind 
there is an imaginative infinity – though can we really speak of ‘a mind’ (for where 
are its boundaries) and can a mind (which is an indeterminate field of energies, firing 
at great speed and unfathomable complexity) have an ‘inside’? 
 
The poet, Robin Blaser, argues that one of the tasks of poetry (and the other arts) is to 
make manifest, or demonstrate, the doubled actuality of the world as stuff and light, 
presenting the world as a confluence of energies and forces that have no fixed 
boundaries - an indeterminate and transparent field of forces.7 Poetry and art can show 
us the transparency of the world we usually tend to see as opaque - even though we 
know it to be at the same time empty of essence and identity. In doing so, the arts 
also, in Heidegger’s terms, celebrate human being as a clearing or opening in which 
possibilities arise, challenging any idea of fixed identity. Blaser also speaks of this 
task as “the open,”8 and it may not be unreasonable to connect this notion with 
Umberto Eco’s idea of the artwork as an ‘open work’ and to go further to consider the 
human self or being as an open work. 
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We can approach these thoughts from another, perhaps unexpected, perspective: 
Adorno’s ideas about what he calls “negative dialectics.”9 It seems to me that Adorno 
considers one of the main purposes of his dialectical method as being to strip away all 
sense of categorical identities, essential truths (however provisional) and theoretical 
definites. He argues that while traditional western philosophy has used a variety of 
dialectical methods to identify or construct positive ideas, positions, theories or 
identities, negative dialectics has no such purpose. Indeed even negative dialectics 
itself is not to be considered as a theoretical standpoint, but rather as a method for 
establishing or realising the fluidity and indefiniteness of all standpoints or identities – 
a method for demonstrating that no concept or standpoint constitutes an essential truth 
or autonomous identity. Thus all truths, standpoints and theories imply or invite 
contradiction. By implication, indefiniteness, (what Adorno calls, non-identity), and 
contradictoriness are integral qualities of reality – or whatever cognitive field we take 
for reality.  
 
One aspect of Adorno’s critique of Hegel is that Hegel uses dialectics to establish or 
construct substantive or essential knowledge, whereas for Adorno, if we are to 
practice philosophy (and to live) in the light of the belief that there are no substantive 
essences, contents or identities, then we have to give up “the illusion that [philosophy] 
might confine the essence in its finite definitions.” (13) Adorno urges us “not to play 
this game” of choosing between Yes and No, True or False, as if these qualities or 
attributes are absolutes or fixed essences. (32) He also argues that: “Dialectics is as 
strictly opposed to [relativism] as to absolutism; but it does not seek a middle ground 
between the two; it opposes them [both] through the extremes themselves, convicts 
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them of untruth by their own ideas.” (35) This is very similar to the methodological 
claims of sceptics like Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus. 
 
Adorno recognises that, as he puts it, “A dialectics no longer ‘glued’ to identity will 
provoke either the charge that it is bottomless […] or the objection that it is dizzying.” 
(31) But Adorno seems to value dizziness or vertigo as a positive quality: “In great 
modern poetry, vertigo has been a central feeling since Baudelaire” (ibid) and this 
vertigo is an “index very” – an index of truth - which is often accompanied by “the 
shock of inconclusiveness.” (33) So the dizzying feeling we get from engaging with 
the work of Baudelaire, Ezra Pound, James Joyce or Anish Kapoor may be the result 
of the fact that these makers realise in their work the flux of nonidentity, cutting the 
threads that bind us to fixed or essential viewpoints and understandings. As Adorno 
writes, negative dialectics does “not come to rest in itself” (ibid) – that is, it is always 
at play, resisting at every turn, reification and the craving for conclusions or answers 
which, in a sense, is the antithesis of art. 
 
I’m reminded of Alan Schneider reporting that when he was once directing a play by 
Samuel Beckett, and trying to understand where Beckett stood in relation to one of his 
characters, Beckett said: “I take no sides. I am interested in the shape of ideas. There 
is a wonderful sentence in Augustine: ‘Do not despair; one of the thieves was saved. 
Do not presume; one of the thieves was damned.’ That sentence has a wonderful 
shape. It is the shape that matters.”10 We could interpret this as arguing for a kind of 
formalism, the sound and shape of the words and sentences as structurally 
meaningful, as formally autonomous. However, at another level Beckett seems to be 
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suggesting both a kind of symmetry in our relationships to things and a suspension of 
judgement (epoche) in relation to statements uttered: “I take no sides.”  
 
To take another turn I’d like to consider a key term within Buddhist thought and 
practice: sunyata, or what I’ve called the mutuality of existence.11 The Sanskrit term, 
sunyata, is usually translated as ‘emptiness’ or ‘the void’ but this can be very 
misleading, as it really refers to the Buddhist insight that no entity (object or idea) 
exists in, or for, itself. Existence consists of a web of mutually dependent or relational 
phenomena – none of which have any autonomous identity or self-existence. They are 
empty or void of self-existence - what Adorno may mean by his term, nonidentity. 
 
The ideas surrounding sunyata are articulated in great depth in Nagarjuna’s 
Sunyavada, or Doctrine of the Void, otherwise known as the Madhyamika, the 
“middle way” – a way that, according to Watts, “refutes all metaphysical propositions 
by demonstrating their relativity.”12 Even the idea of sunyata itself, is relative and 
void. 
 
 
It cannot be called void or not void, 
Or both or neither; 
But in order to point it out, 
It is called ‘the Void.’13 
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This is reminiscent of Adorno’s injunction not to consider negative dialectics as a 
particular philosophical standpoint but as a method for engaging with non-identity and 
the flux of dialectical play. 
 
Perhaps, having linked ideas from physics, poetics, Adorno, Beckett and Madhyamika 
Buddhism, we should make another sideways leap to consider a kind of dialectical 
method employed by G.K. Chesterton, the half-forgotten eccentric metaphysician and 
author of the Father Brown stories. One word can simply characterise Chesterton’s 
complex metaphysics: paradox. Chesterton, in his various guises as novelist, short-
story writer, poet and Catholic apologist, explores the supreme paradox: that the 
Many is One; and, the One is Many. He is a masterful logician and sceptical believer 
who uses reason to undo reasonable assumptions. As Hugh Kenner notes: “If 
[Chesterton] saw two truths that seemed to contradict each other, he would take the 
two truths and the contradiction along with them.”14 There would be no question of 
trying to reduce the complex paradoxes of existence to what he considered to be 
reasonable but illogical platitudes. A lamppost is both a hard metal object and a field 
of light, a fact and a fiction, a mundane thing and an inexplicable mystery. Kenner 
again: “the world is a baffling place, incapable of being enmeshed in a phrase or a 
formula.”15 Chesterton accepts that there are no fixed identities, he anticipates, in 
many ways, Adorno’s idea of nonidentity. He sums up his own position thus: 
 
All the straight roads of logic lead to some Bedlam, to Anarchism or to passive 
obedience, to treating the universe as a clockwork of matter or else as a delusion of 
the mind. It is only the Mystic, the man who accepts the contradictions, who can 
laugh and walk easily through the world.16  
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In other words, it is one of the functions of art to reveal or manifest the indeterminate 
non-identity of how things are. 
 
When we encounter the permeable lattice of structures made by poets like Ezra 
Pound, W.C. Williams, Charles Olson or Anne Carson, and artists like Joseph Beuys, 
Dove Bradshaw, Anish Kapoor or Helen Chadwick, we are looking through the 
energy fields of perception, representation and language, into the energy fields of 
materiality, chemistry, atomic and quantum physics. The artwork is an example of 
poetic transubstantiation – each poem or artwork manifests a doubled or indeterminate 
non-identity, it is at the same time a material object and a zone of possibility, an 
object in space and an opening of consciousness. 
 
In our engagements with artworks we are often confronted with a state of actuality 
that is neither this nor that, (Sanskrit: neti neti), yet also this and that, a coincidence of 
opposites in which truth is always plural, bifurcated, multi-facetted and diamond-like. 
Artworks are very beneficial partly because they often bring us to a mental clearing - 
a lightening of mind and being, in which we realise that there are no fixed essences or 
essential truths but only a network of interdependent possibilities and potentialities 
open to endless reformulation and change. We find art exciting and revitalising in so 
far as we become open to many equal and contradictory meanings – all and none of 
which are true. In a sense we may feel let down or constrained if we encounter an 
artwork that has an overt meaning or story. The imposition of meaning or symbolic-
value, by the artist or a critic, is something we tend to resist or react against. Overly 
didactic, dogmatic or propagandist art tends not to be valued for long, precisely 
because it tries to insist on one interpretation, on one fixed identity.  
  10
The artwork and the self or subject can be considered as a nexus of possibilities, a 
dynamic space within which potential is actualised, interpretations are formed and re-
formed, actions are modified and reframed, stories and images are revisioned, and 
beliefs and values are endlessly revised. The experiential field of the artwork is a field 
of liminal experience, of becoming, of betweenness, in which irreconciliable 
oppositions are recognised and handled as manifestations of the indeterminacy and 
mutuality of existence. This view of art as a zone of interpretation and 
transubstantiation, and as a nexus of possibilities, is radically different to the notion of 
art as a zone of truth - a place, or object, in which a truth resides or is revealed. 
 
In our encounters with artworks we encounter the paradox of transubstantiation, the 
uncomfortable realisation that things are both stuff and light, not this or that, but this 
and that - many things at once. Empty of essence, and indeterminate as to meaning 
and identity, artworks are a challenge to any tendency towards dogmatism, 
reductionism and reification. What we look for in artworks is, at the very least, many 
possible meanings, a zone of interpretative possibility in which ideas about truth are 
contested or presented in a complex way, or in which our usual notions or 
assumptions are challenged and our tendency towards binary judgements (true/false, 
right/wrong, good/bad) are suspended. In being open to many interpretations we are 
liberated from the dictatorship of one, and are thus empowered. We become, for a 
time at least, more porous, transparent and open, able to suspend judgement for a time 
and to enjoy the unpredictable play of sensations, ideas and the intermingling of 
minds.  
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Perhaps it would be useful to carry these ways of thinking and being out of the art 
gallery or concert hall and use them to live with the conflicts and uncertainties that 
confront us in the complex uncertain world outside.   
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